The Effect Of Java On Network Benefits In Computer Software Markets by Sarnikar, Supriya
The Journal of Applied Business Research – First Quarter 2008 Volume 24, Number 1 
103 
The Effect Of Java On Network Benefits  
In Computer Software Markets 
Supriya Sarnikar, (E-mail: ssarnikar@wsc.ma.edu), Westfield State College 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In markets that exhibit network effects it is often believed that society gets inefficiently locked into 
an inferior technology. This paper utilizes data generated by a natural experiment, afforded by the 
introduction of the programming language Java, to test whether computer software markets are 
prone to inefficient lock-in. Findings from a hedonic price regression indicate that Java effectively 
increased the level of competition in the software applications market and lowered prices of 
applications software. The regression results are not consistent with the hypothesis of inefficient 
lock-in. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
n a recent antitrust action
1
 against Microsoft Corporation, it was argued that the large installed base of 
Microsoft‟s Windows operating system virtually guaranteed its continued dominance in the computer 
operating systems market. The market for computer software is widely believed to be characterized by 
network effects.
2
 Existing literature suggests that network effects lead to de-facto standardization and that the 
presence of a large installed base often leads to de-facto standardization and excess inertia in the adoption of new 
and superior technologies. See for eg., Farrell and Saloner(1986)
3
, Katz and Shapiro(1986), Arthur(1989) and, 
Mitchell and Skrzpacz(2006). Anecdotal and experimental evidence is provided in the literature which suggests that 
the technologies adopted in some markets such as typewriters (David, 1985), Video Cassette Recorders (Cusumano 
et.al., 1992), nuclear submarines (Cowan, 1990) etc., may have been inefficient because users were locked into 
inferior technologies in these markets. Liebowitz and Margolis(1990) show that the experimental evidence provided 
in David(1985) is flawed and present alternative views on welfare impact of network effects in later research (See 
Liebowitz and Margolis (1995 and 2001)). More recent empirical papers attempt to measure the extent of network 
effects and explore the subject further (See Gandal, Kende and Rob (2000). But none of these papers test the theory 
of inefficient lock-in directly or indirectly. However, the theory continues its hold even in recent theoretical papers. 
See Farrell and Klemperer(2006). Given the policy implications of such beliefs and the ever increasing importance 
of network industries in the global economy, it becomes more important to subject this theory to empirical testing. 
Direct tests of this theory, however, are very difficult to conduct as the necessary data are unavailable in most 
instances.
4
 In this paper, data from a recent natural experiment are used and an indirect test of the “inefficient lock-
in” theory is constructed.  
 
 The focus of this paper is on the network effects in the market for Personal Computer Operating Systems. 
A computer operating system provides an interface between the computer‟s Central Processing Unit (CPU) and the 
                                                          
1 The US Dept. of Justice brought an antitrust action against Microsoft Corporation in 1998. 
2 Network effects are said to exist if the value of a product to a consumer increases with the number of other consumers of the 
same product. In computer software markets, for example, individual consumers benefit from a bigger „network‟ of consumers 
because they can exchange files with a greater number of other users and also because a greater number of complementary 
software is available for the bigger network. Other examples of products and services that exhibit network effects are Video 
Cassette Recorders, CD Players, telephony, e-mail etc. 
3Farrell and Saloner (1986) show that under some circumstances, “excess momentum” in the adoption of a new technology may 
also occur. 
4 See Foray(1997) for a detailed discussion of the empirical difficulties in directly testing the theory of inefficient technological 
lock-in. 
I 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – First Quarter 2008 Volume 24, Number 1 
104 
various pieces of hardware such as the monitor, printer, etc. Operating systems also control the interaction between 
various applications software such as word-processing or spreadsheet programs, and the CPU. In general, 
application software written for a particular operating system cannot run on a different operating system without 
extensive and costly modifications. Since a huge component of software development costs is fixed, more vendors 
of software applications prefer to develop applications software for the dominant operating system than the less 
popular operating systems. Therefore as the network size grows, the number of complementary software compatible 
with the dominant operating system increases. This effect has been termed as indirect network externalities in 
Gandal(1994). 
 
 Microsoft Corporation currently dominates the market for PC operating systems with its family of 
Windows operating systems. It is argued that the availability of a greater number of complementary software was 
crucial for the widespread adoption of Microsoft‟s operating systems and for its continued dominance in this market 
(Gandal, Greenstein and Salant 1999). In 1995, Sun Microsystems Inc. introduced a new programming language 
called Java which posed a potentially serious threat to the dominance of Windows in the operating systems market.
5
 
Java made it possible, through its Java Virtual Machine (JVM), for programmers to write applications that would 
run on any operating system. Thus it became possible for developers of application software to write a single 
program that would run on any operating system enabled with JVM
6
 thereby greatly reducing the costs of software 
development. (In the absence of Java, software developers would have to write separate programs in order to ensure 
compatibility with each of the different operating platforms.) Netscape Navigator, which was the leading Internet 
browser at the time, was the major distribution channel for JVM
7
. Even though the need for an operating system 
could not be eliminated, Netscape and Java together presented an alternative platform to which applications could be 
written thereby creating greater potential for competition both in the market for operating systems and the market for 
applications software.  
 
 If Java delivered on its promise, consumers using non-Windows operating systems could also have a 
greater number and variety of application software available to them.
8
 Thus Java possessed the potential to eliminate 
or at least, reduce the indirect network effects in the market for operating systems. However, this promise did not 
materialize as programs written in Java tended to be much slower in executing than programs written in other 
languages such as C. In addition, there were security concerns being voiced in the industry regarding Java „applets‟9. 
Despite these initial concerns, Java enjoyed a good deal of support and a steady rate of adoption in all of 1996 and 
most of 1997
10. In the second half of 1997 however, Microsoft introduced its own “impure” version of Java that ran 
better with its own browser and operating system than with the other browsers or operating systems. These actions 
along with other alleged anti-competitive behavior led to the antitrust trial of Microsoft. Microsoft was accused of 
using its dominant position in the PC operating systems market to push its own Internet browsing technology. (See 
Gilbert and Katz(2001), Klein (2001) Whinston(2001), Gilbert (1995), Lopatka and Page (1995) for a history and 
economic analysis of the various arguments against Microsoft). Microsoft‟s actions coupled with Sun Microsystems 
Corp‟s inability to get Java adopted as an international standard dealt a serious setback to further adoption and 
development of Java as a cross-platform language. As a consequence, there were only a few software applications 
written in Java that were commercially available. Most of the applications tended to be custom-written for specific 
                                                          
5 InfoWorld (Nov.13, 1995) “Java OS; Sun focuses on eclipsing Windows.” 
6 Java World (May 1996) “ Java jumps to operating systems: All major operating systems to build in support for Java” 
7InfoWorld May 29, 1995 “Netscape Inks Pact with Sun” – „”Netscape 2.0 came with a built in support for Java. This version 
became available in late 1995. Until then, Sun‟s Hot Java browser was the only java-compatible browser.”‟ 
8 See InfoWorld (Oct. 30, 1995) “Smell of Java lures scores of vendors.” 
9 “Despite growing support, some security concerns are being raised about Java applets…although Sun maintains that Java 
includes facilities for screening out viruses, Java applets might open up undetectable security holes on a client computer.” 
InfoWorld Oct.30 1995: „Smell of Java lures scores of vendors‟. “Lord knows, interpreters are slow. Pre-compiling Java source 
code into portable byte codes saves the time needed for translating syntax, but interpreting byte codes in the Java virtual machine 
(JVM) is still exceedingly slow compared to the native code produced by a compiler. Thus, Java performance is generally 
deemed acceptable for small applets but not for any sizable application.” Java World, March 1998. 
10 “Software Development ‟96: Java is this year‟s hot ticket” Java World, April 1996. “Educators embrace Java: High marks in 
college signal long-term, real world success of new programming language”, Java World, January 1997. 
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customers. However Sun Microsystems continued to try to improve its technology in order to encourage its 
adoption.
11
  
 
 In summary, it may be argued that even though Java had not yet demonstrated itself to be a superior 
technology it did have the potential to create more competition in the market for applications software and therefore 
had the potential to reduce the indirect network effects in the market for computer operating systems. To the extent 
that indirect network effects are crucial for the continued dominance of an operating system, the weakening of 
network effects would bring greater competition to the computer operating systems market. Similar arguments have 
been made by Takahashi and Namiki(2003). This paper however is the first to test whether Java was successful in 
bringing competition before the alleged anti-competitive actions took place. 
 
MODEL 
 
 A random utility model is used to show that the firms whose software products are compatible with the 
dominant operating system will command a higher price than firms whose software products are not compatible 
with the dominant operating system. It is argued that the effect of the introduction of Java was (1) to reduce the 
difference in the extent of network benefits of the Windows vs. non-Windows operating system by increasing the 
value of the non-Windows network and (2) create more competition both in the application software markets and the 
Operating System market.  
 
 Consider the choice of application software by consumers who have already invested in one of the two 
operating systems, A or B. Operating system A has a bigger network of users.  
 
Assumptions 
 
1) There are two firms 1 and 2 that produce application software compatible with the dominant operating 
system A and firm 3 produces software compatible with the operating system B. This assumption is 
consistent with the observation that more firms are likely to produce software for the larger network than 
for the smaller network. 
2) The software compatible with operating system A is incompatible with the operating system B and 
therefore cannot be substituted by software that is compatible with the operating system B and vice versa. 
3) The greater the variety of complementary products compatible with any product, the higher the network 
benefit. The benefit from compatibility with the dominant Operating System of network of size SA is W(SA) 
and the benefit from compatibility with the less popular operating system B of network size SB is W(SB). 
By assumption, therefore SA SB and W(SA) > W(SB). 
 
The consumers on the operating system A-network have a choice either to buy nothing or to buy 
application software from firm 1 or from firm 2. The corresponding utilities of each choice are as follows: 
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Whereas consumers of the operating system B choose between buying nothing and buying application software from 
firm3. The corresponding utilities of each choice are as follows: 
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11 “Sun‟s Hotspot technology promises to deliver interpreted byte codes that run faster than a compiled program” „Hotspot: A 
new breed of virtual machine‟, Java World, March 1998. 
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Ac1 , 
Ac2 and 
Bc3 denote the value of the different product characteristics offered by firms 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
AV  and BV  denote the value of waiting another period(s) before buying any software. BAA ppp 321 ,, , denote the 
prices charged by firms 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
 
 The ‟s represent consumers‟ idiosyncratic tastes and are assumed to have a double exponential distribution 
therefore the difference between the ‟s will be distributed according to the logit. The A’s are independent of the 
B’s. The probability that an individual consumer chooses firm 1‟s product is then given by the probability that 
andUU AA 21 
AA UU 01   which is equal to the probability that the difference between the random component of 
the utility is greater than the non-random component. The total number of consumers is normalized to one so that 
the demand for each product is given by the probability that the product is chosen. 
 
 Given our assumptions, the demand function for each product is given by: 
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A and B are parameters of the logit distribution and are positive constants. 
 
 Given the above consumer demand functions, the firms choose prices simultaneously to maximize their 
individual profit functions, which are denoted by  below. „F‟ denotes the fixed costs of developing software. 
BBBBAAAAAAAA FDpFDpFDp 333322221111 ;;    
 
The first order conditions yield the following implicit relationships for the prices. 
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Predictions from the model are as below. 
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; Therefore, as quality improves the price of the software 
increases, ceteris paribus.  
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increases, ceteris paribus, the price of the application software increases. 
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As the value of waiting increases, ceteris paribus, the prices of all applications software on either network 
will decrease. It is argued that the introduction of Java and the possibility of cross-platform applications becoming 
available in the future should have increased the consumers‟ value of waiting in both networks. Therefore the 
potential for increased competition in the future should have depressed prices of all platform-specific applications 
software regardless of the operating system network
12
. In order to induce the customers who value cross-platform 
applications to buy platform-dependent software now, firms would have to lower prices considerably. Software 
firms would have a strategic incentive to lower prices on existing prices of platform-specific software because if 
they manage to capture a larger share of the existing applications market they would then have a better chance of 
capturing the newly emerging cross-platform market as well. This is because users experience significant switching 
costs in learning to use new software. For example, if one is used to the interface and functionality offered by 
WordPerfect then, as an end user, one would prefer to use WordPerfect whether working on a machine that is 
running Microsoft Windows, IBM‟s OS/2 or any other operating system. That is, most end users do not care about 
the operating system they are running but only about the applications that are available for the operating system. 
Thus, even though a customer may value cross-platform capabilities of an application, it would still prefer 
applications that look, feel, and function just like the applications that the customers used before cross-platform 
capability became a possibility. 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS - HEDONIC PRICE REGRESSIONS 
 
To test whether the introduction of Java actually resulted in lower prices of platform-dependent software 
applications, a quality-adjusted hedonic price regression model similar to Gandal (1994) is used. The data 
correspond to the time period 1993-1997 and focus on the market for graphics software applications. Graphics 
software applications were chosen for several reasons. First, graphics applications were sold largely as stand-alone 
products during the time period under consideration. This is important because it helps to separate the effects of 
bundling from the effects of pure price competition. A second reason for choosing graphics software was that all the 
graphics applications offered compatibility with all the standard graphics file formats. This meant that there were no 
significant direct network externalities within the graphics market itself and there was no clear leader or dominant 
product among the various graphics software programs during this time frame. A third reason is that Microsoft was 
not a major player in this market. Entry in markets where Microsoft was vertically integrated such as the word 
processing market was more difficult and less likely but in markets where Microsoft lacked a strong presence such 
as the graphics applications market, entry was more likely (See Liebowitz and Margolis 2001). Microsoft gained a 
presence through the acquisition of Corel graphics in 2003 but during the time period in this study, Microsoft lacked 
a significant presence. 
 
The empirical model is a regression of the log of the real price of the graphics applications on a number of 
independent variables that measured the quality and performance characteristics of the applications. Time dummies 
control for any time specific effects and dummies representing each firm in the dataset control for any firm fixed 
effects. The installed base of the operating system that the software application program is primarily written for, 
served as a measure of the size of the operating system network. The coefficient on the installed base variable, if 
significant, would be an indicator of whether the application providers were able to capture any premium for 
compatibility with the dominant operating system. The introduction of Java increased the potential for 
                                                          
12Even though the value of waiting another period may be higher for consumers on network B, it is not clear whether this would 
result in the prices of B-compatible software falling more than A-compatible software. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – First Quarter 2008 Volume 24, Number 1 
108 
competition in both the operating systems market and the software applications market. In the applications market it 
would have increased the value of the option to wait for cross-platform applications. Therefore, as shown in the 
previous section, it would result in a fall in the prices of platform-specific applications on both operating systems. 
 
DATA 
 
 Data on the price and quality characteristics of graphics application software was compiled from product 
reviews published in PC magazine, InfoWorld, PC World, PC Computing, Compute!, Windows magazine and OS/2 
e-zine for the years 1993-1997. Graphics software comes in different packaged forms – some are written for very 
specific purposes such as illustration, image viewing and editing, desktop publishing (DTP), charting etc. while 
others include two or more of these functions. The data correspond to all of these programs and every effort was 
made to control for all the features that described these software packages. The resulting sample is an unbalanced 
panel with a total of 107 observations out of which 13 were compatible with OS/2, and the rest with the Windows 
operating system. There were 42 distinct software products. Whenever multiple versions (such as standard and 
professional) were available for any product in the same year, each version was treated as a separate product i.e. 
each version is a separate observation within the same year. Version upgrades (such as version 1.0 and version 2.0) 
are treated as the same product i.e., whenever two versions (old and new) were available in the same year, only the 
new version appears in the sample in that year. If no new version was available in the subsequent year(s) but the old 
version continued to be sold and was reviewed in any of the above mentioned magazines, then the old version 
appeared in the sample in the subsequent year(s) also as it was a choice available to consumers in the subsequent 
years. Such observations however were few and the results presented are not sensitive to the inclusion of the same.  
The following is a list of all the variables in the empirical model. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
RPRICE: is the list price of the product in real dollars. As the street price was not available for all the products in 
the sample, the list price was used even though it does not represent the ultimate cost to consumers. However, this 
should not be of great concern since the list price is found to be very highly (over 99 percent) correlated with the 
street price and typically the discount, which was typically found to be about 30-55 percent, was found to be 
uncorrelated with the characteristics of the software. The natural log of the real list price is the dependent variable in 
this model.  
 
The independent variables include a list of quality characteristics, a measure of network size, a variable that is 
constructed to measure the impact of Java and a list of variables that control for fixed time and firm effects.  
 
Independent Variables 
 
Measures Of Quality 
 
 CLIPART: This dummy variable takes on a value of 1 if the package comes with a library of pre-selected 
pictures that may be useful in constructing illustrations. This feature is most useful for users who are not 
professional graphics designers.  
 MULTIMEDIA: The variable MULTIMEDIA takes on a value of 1 if the package offers support for 
sound, video and/or animation, zero otherwise.  
 TEXT: The variable TEXT takes on a value of 1 if the software is capable of importing either formatted or 
unformatted (ASCII) text. All software had some capability of inserting text onto an image but not all could 
import text. This feature is most useful for desktop publishing tasks. 
 DATA: This variable takes on a value of 1 if the program can import data from at least one of the popular 
data storage and manipulation programs such as Excel, Lotus, and DBase. 
 RAM: This is a continuous variable representing the minimum amount of Random Access Memory (RAM) 
that was required to run the program. This was included to control for the hardware requirement standards 
that might influence consumer‟s demand for any software. Also generally speaking, it is observed 
especially for graphics applications that the more features a program has, the more RAM it requires to run 
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smoothly. Therefore, this may also serve as a proxy for the many quality characteristics that cannot be 
easily measured.  
 CHARTS: This variable takes on a value of 1 if the program is capable of creating at least basic charts 
such as a bar, pie and line graphs etc.  
 OLE: This variable takes on a value of 1 if the program supports Object Linking and Embedding (OLE). 
This feature enables active links between different programs- thus if the data underlying a chart is changed 
in the spreadsheet program, it is automatically reflected in the linked chart. This feature is only available 
for Windows compatible software. However since not all Windows compatible software included this 
feature, it is important and possible to control for the feature. 
 DDE: This variable takes on a value of 1 if the program supports Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE). This 
also is a feature that is available only for Windows compatible software however all not Windows 
compatible software provide it.  
 DRAW: is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the software is primarily meant for illustration 
purposes and therefore provides specialized and sophisticated drawing tools that are generally unavailable 
in other graphics applications. 
 EDIT: is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the software is primarily meant for viewing and 
editing photos/images. 
 DTP: (Desktop Publishing) is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the software consists of 
specialized tools for publishing activities. 
 PRES: is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the software provides special presentation tools.  
 
Measures Of Compatibility 
 
 File format standards: The dummy variables BMP, EPS, GIF, JPEG and TIFF take on the value of 1 if 
the package offers full/partial compatibility with the respective formats. Compatibility with a particular 
format allows the user to exchange files with other software applications that support the format. Graphics 
image formats fall in two broad categories – bitmap and vector. Bitmap images store information in the 
form of dots and pixels whereas vector images are collections of vectors and shapes. Of all the file formats 
listed above, .EPS is a vector format whereas the others are bitmaps. The .GIF and .JPG (JPEG) formats are 
most used for web publishing. An alternative variable (BITMAP) was also constructed, which took on the 
value of one if the application provided compatibility with all of the four bitmap formats listed above and 
zero otherwise. 
 WIN95: This variable indicates compatibility with Windows95 operating platform. Microsoft released 
Windows95 in August/September of 1995 even though it had pre-announced this new improved upgraded 
version much earlier. Windows95 was a 32-bit operating system that would have made incorporation of 
many additional quality features possible for software applications.  This variable was therefore included to 
account for the improved quality features that it may have made possible. The coefficient on this variable 
therefore is expected to be positive.  
 INST_BASE:  is a continuous variable that is a measure of the installed base (in millions of units) of the 
operating system in any given year. For example, if the observation corresponds to a program that is 
compatible with the Windows operating system in the year 1993, then the variable takes on the value of the 
installed base of Microsoft‟s operating systems in 1993. The sample considered consists of software written 
for the OS/2 and both Windows3.1 and Windows95 platforms. The installed base data for 1992 was 
obtained from extracts of International Data Corporation‟s (IDC) reports published in various software 
magazines. The installed base data for the rest of the years was constructed from the market share and 
shipments data in the now publicly available trial exhibits from the Microsoft Antitrust case.  
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Fixed Effects 
 
 TIME: The time dummies YR_93, YR_94, YR_95, YR_96, YR_97 take on a value of 1 if the data 
correspond to that year. These dummies serve as a control for any market-wide or economy-wide time-
specific exogenous factors that might have impacted the prices of the software under consideration. 
 FIRM: The data correspond to graphics application software that was developed by either of 22 firms. The 
firm dummies serve as a control for any number of unobserved characteristics that are unique to a firm 
and/or its product (e.g. the product interface, ease of use, organizational culture etc.). In addition, the 
dummies also serve as controls for the firm‟s market share and resultant network effects within the graphics 
applications market. As there was no single firm or product that was a clear leader in all the segments of 
this market during the time period under consideration, it is reasonable to assume that this is an adequate 
control for the direct network effects, if any, within the graphics software market.  
 
The Effect Of Java 
 
 JAVA: is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 only if the software was introduced after October 
1995. It is important to note that this variable is not simply equal to the sum of the 95, 96 and 97-time 
dummies. This was because (1) this variable takes on a value of one for only a subset of the observations in 
year 1995 and (2) because I have observations for versions of software applications that continued to be 
sold after October 1995 but were actually introduced before October 1995 and so these observations had a 
value of zero for the JAVA dummy. Typically firms introduced new versions of their product on a cycle of 
one to two years. However there were some applications that did not see new updated versions for the 
entire period under consideration. The sample includes observations on all software that was available for 
sale and that was reviewed during the time period under consideration even if the versions were old. To 
check for robustness of results the regressions were estimated without the old software as well. The results 
were not sensitive to including the old software. 
 
RESULTS 
 
 The descriptive statistics are shown in the appendix Table 1. Table 2 shows the regression results. The first 
column of Table 2 shows the parameter estimates for the full model.  The quality and performance characteristics 
captured by the measures of text and data handling capabilities are positive and statistically significant. On average, 
the software that provided text capability was priced 42 percent higher than software that did not provide such 
capability. Similarly data handling capabilities increased prices by almost 30 percent. The results also show that the 
memory requirement RAM serves as a proxy for performance features that are hard to measure and on average 
every additional megabyte of RAM required resulted in a price increase of about 1.1 - 1.4 percent. The negative 
coefficient on multimedia is baffling but this variable was highly correlated with RAM and therefore the coefficient 
on RAM should be appropriately interpreted in conjunction with the coefficient on Multimedia capability. 
 
The coefficient on installed base is statistically insignificant suggesting that the applications providers are 
unable to charge any premium for compatibility with the Windows platform. This result even though unexpected, is 
not unreasonable as it is possible that the application providers are unable to charge a higher premium for the bigger 
network since they also face greater competition in the bigger market. This suggests that any compatibility premium 
probably goes entirely to the producer of the dominant operating system with the application providers unable to 
capture any significant premiums due to existing and potential competition. 
 
 The coefficient on the JAVA term is negative and statistically significant at the one percent significance 
level. This suggests that even though software providers were already unable to charge any premium for 
compatibility with the dominant operating system, the introduction of Java further eroded their price-markups by 
increasing the possibility of more competition in the future. The increase in competition is also evident in the 
number of software written for OS/2 after 1995. Even though these applications were not cross-platform capable, 
there was a rise in the number of software written exclusively for OS/2 as is evident from our data (See Table 1 for 
descriptive statistics).  
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 The least squares dummy variable approach taken here to estimate firm fixed effects leads to a high level of 
multi-collinearity. The Belsley-Kuh-Welch condition index was found to be between 40-80. Such collinearity 
among the regressors is not unusual in hedonic regressions where most of the regressors are dummy variables. The 
problem is aggravated due to the additional dummies that control for firm fixed effects. Due to the three-way error 
components (firm, product and time components in the residual error term) in this model however, it was not 
possible to use the usual fixed effects estimator. As the data collected corresponds to almost the entire population of 
graphics applications, it is not possible to further enhance it. Another remedy is to drop the variables that are highly 
collinear and/or most insignificant from the model. The results show that the file format standards in general are 
highly collinear and not an important determinant of the product‟s price. But instead of dropping them from the 
model, they were combined into a single measure of compatibility. In column 3 of Table 2 the variables BMP, GIF, 
JPEG and TIFF were dropped from the model and instead included the variable BITMAP (The construction of this 
variable is explained above in the variable descriptions). The results show that compatibility with all the four file 
format standards increases the price by almost 26 percent. The other parameter estimates do not change very much 
but the standard errors are lower thereby improving efficiency of the estimates. The condition index falls but still 
remains beyond the recommended level.  I therefore re-estimate the model by dropping the variables that are most 
insignificant (EPS and Clipart). Column 5 of Table 2 shows the results when the least significant variables are 
dropped from the model. The precision of the estimates improves slightly and the condition index drops further 
(from 57 to 44) and is closer to the acceptable level of 30. 
 
 The column 7 of Table 2 shows regression estimates with the variable WIN95 included. The inclusion of 
this variable increases the overall condition index and lowers the efficiency of estimates. The variable itself is 
statistically insignificant and therefore we may conclude that the negative coefficient on JAVA is indeed a result of 
greater anticipated competition rather than a coincidental effect of the almost simultaneous introduction of 
Windows95. I expected the effect on prices of Windows95 to be positive due to the improved quality features. Most 
of the firms in the sample introduced newer versions for Windows95 simultaneously with the introduction of 
Windows95. Therefore, any drop in prices due to consumers waiting for a Windows95 version would have occurred 
prior to the introduction of software compatible with Windows95 i.e. before August 1995. Therefore the drop in 
prices observed after the introduction of Windows95-compatible software could be reasonably attributed to the 
introduction of Java. 
 
 The consistent negative effect on prices from the Java variable therefore, indicates that Java was indeed 
effective in increasing the potential for competition in the market for graphics software applications and therefore in 
reducing the indirect network effects in the PC-operating system market. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This paper contributes to the scarce empirical literature on network effects and provides an indirect test of 
their impact on welfare. The results from the hedonic price regressions suggest that the potential availability of a 
platform-independent software application helped to decrease the prices of all graphics software. The results 
therefore suggest that despite the demand-side and supply-side economies of scale that are thought to exist in the 
software markets in general, these markets are quite competitive. The significant increase in the number of software 
applications available for the OS/2 platform after the introduction of Java and the reduction in prices of all graphics 
software suggest that Java was indeed successful in reducing the indirect network effects in the PC operating 
systems market. Given the hypothesized importance of indirect network benefits in the PC operating system market, 
the results might be interpreted to suggest that the PC operating system market might also be subject to competition. 
Future research would directly test whether or not positive feedback is indeed present in the PC operating systems 
market and whether such feedback leads to inefficient market outcomes. 
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Table 1: Real Prices by Year and Operating Platform 
YEAR=95 YEAR=93 
OS Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
OS/2 2 323.43 1.64 322.27 324.59 2 450.73 148.24 345.91 555.56 
Windows 3.X 13 333.77 168.95 84.59 595.48 19 397.01 137.42 172.68 625.44 
Windows95 6 355.55 146.26 220.85 583.06 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
YEAR=96 YEAR=94 
OS Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
OS/2 4 182.03 110.94 63.05 316.09 1 331.33 . 331.33 331.33 
Windows 3.X 8 371.20 174.27 160.57 579.66 19 373.66 157.25 87.16 612.18 
Windows95 10 338.24 153.07 127.81 572.62 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
YEAR=97      
OS Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max      
OS/2 4 83.64 50.27 43.53 155.47      
Windows 3.X 5 439.83 172.56 180.40 558.68      
Windows95 14 327.55 121.88 210.82 558.68      
 
 
Table 2: Hedonic Price Regression Estimates 
(Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the software’s list price in real dollars LnRPRICE) 
Number of observations = 107 
Variable Name 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
INTERCEPT 5.4354 0.3078 5.5796 0.2689 5.5377 0.2023 5.55098 0.2043 
Installed Base -0.0009 0.0030 -0.0004 0.0028 -0.0007 0.0027 0.000189 0.00302 
JAVA -0.2553 0.0974 -0.2486 0.0924 -0.2543 0.0903 -0.31075 0.12729 
DRAW 0.3160 0.1158 0.3272 0.1080 0.3124 0.1003 0.30623 0.10119 
EDIT 0.3696 0.1221 0.3586 0.1144 0.3610 0.1127 0.34695 0.11536 
DTP 0.2363 0.1857 0.2191 0.1722 0.2581 0.1447 0.24528 0.14675 
PRES -0.1152 0.2239 -0.2433 0.1917 -0.2403 0.1885 -0.23822 0.18937 
BMP 0.2971 0.2895 ---- ---- ---- --- ---- ---- 
EPS 0.0903 0.1961 -0.0115 0.1513 ---- ---- ---- ---- 
GIF 0.1092 0.1629 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
JPEG 0.1516 0.1438 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
TIFF -0.1333 0.1997 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
Clipart -0.0944 0.1137 -0.0465 0.1045 ---- ---- ---- ---- 
Multimedia -0.2121 0.1301 -0.1877 0.1126 -0.2016 0.1062 -0.22126 0.11106 
TEXT 0.3928 0.1126 0.4181 0.1066 0.4203 0.1035 0.41898 0.10394 
DATA 0.2015 0.1791 0.2986 0.1382 0.3004 0.1356 0.29576 0.13636 
RAM 0.0145 0.0106 0.0146 0.0100 0.0138 0.0097 0.01096 0.01075 
Charts -0.0902 0.1328 -0.1227 0.1209 -0.1182 0.1186 -0.11695 0.1191 
OLE 0.0731 0.0923 0.1239 0.0805 0.1153 0.0765 0.11707 0.07689 
DDE -0.0936 0.0985 -0.1043 0.0950 -0.1064 0.0933 -0.10538 0.09375 
YR_94 -0.0886 0.0829 -0.1105 0.0770 -0.1106 0.0744 -0.12077 0.07643 
YR_95 -0.1630 0.1116 -0.1870 0.1041 -0.1902 0.1007 -0.22132 0.11254 
YR_96 -0.1261 0.1640 -0.1706 0.1476 -0.1659 0.1450 -0.19772 0.15408 
YR_97 -0.1121 0.2460 -0.1786 0.2210 -0.1655 0.2161 -0.22497 0.23657 
BITMAP ---- ---- 0.2595 0.1109 0.2656 0.1084 0.26998 0.10911 
WIN95 ---- ---- --- ---- ---- ---- 0.09021 0.14269 
Condition Index 76.5500  57.6500  44.4500  45.485  
R-Square  0.9204 0.9206  0.9204  0.9208  
Adjusted R- Square  0.8639 0.8705  0.8740  0.8729  
Notes: The Regressions also included firm dummies that are not reported here in order to save space. I rejected the pooled OLS 
model in favor of the firm fixed effects at the one percent significance level based on results from an F-test. 
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